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This article contributes to the literature on board effectiveness by being perhaps the first to
systematically examine how the nature of outside directors’ prior experience, and resulting
expertise, will influence the performance of a focal firm’s strategic initiatives. Our theoretical
model is grounded in the psychological literature on expertise and its role in group decision
making effectiveness. We focus on outside director expertise in acquisition decision making, and
its implications for the performance of the acquisitions of a focal firm. Our conceptual framework
indicates that directors will develop expertise in making particular kinds of acquisition decisions
(e.g., related or unrelated acquisitions or acquisitions in specific industries or product markets)
through their past experiences at other firms with decisions about those specific types of
acquisitions, and we predict that this experience and expertise will have positive effects on
the performance of a focal firm’s acquisitions. We extend our theoretical model to consider
the conditions under which relevant director experience will prove most beneficial. Our model
predicts that outside director acquisition expertise will deliver the greatest benefits when the
focal firm’s board is independent from management. We find empirical support for all of our
hypotheses. In considering how and when director experience and resulting expertise may
influence the performance of corporate acquisitions, our theory and results help to highlight
a potential second main focus for research on the long-standing question of what factors render
boards of directors effective. Copyright  2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
INTRODUCTION
The question of what board characteristics ren-
der boards best able to make a positive impact
on firm-level performance outcomes is among the
most extensively researched topics in the large
body of scholarship on corporate boards of direc-
tors. Agency theory and related behavioral per-
spectives that currently dominate the management
literature on board effectiveness focus on boards’
‘decision control’ role and argue that boards will
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have positive performance effects to the extent that
they are ‘independent’ from management (Fama
and Jensen, 1983; Bhagat and Black, 2002). Inde-
pendent boards are expected to have a beneficial
impact on performance because they are more
willing to interject themselves into strategic deci-
sion making to prevent firm managers from pur-
suing ill-conceived strategic initiatives. Prevailing
theory suggests that greater independence can be
achieved by instituting particular changes in board
structure and composition, including, for exam-
ple, the separation of the CEO and board chair
positions and the appointment of more outside
directors; these actions are believed to increase
directors’ propensities to intervene in corporate
affairs (Daily, Dalton, and Cannella, 2003; Dalton
et al., 1998).
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While a number of studies do suggest that
certain kinds of policy outcomes, such as stock
option repricing and greenmail, that would seem to
be inconsistent with shareholder interests are less
likely to be pursued to the extent that a firm’s board
has characteristics that enhance director indepen-
dence (Westphal and Zajac, 1995; Finkelstein
and Hambrick, 1996; Pollock, Fischer, and Wade,
2002)1, a now extensive collection of empirical
studies has failed to support the bedrock agency
theory proposition that board independence leads
to superior overall firm performance. A recent
comprehensive meta-analysis by Dalton and col-
leagues (1998) concluded that board independence
is not consistently associated with better firm per-
formance, and recent narrative reviews of the lit-
erature have drawn similar conclusions (Chatter-
jee and Harrison, 2001; Bhagat and Black, 2002).
In light of these findings, a number of promi-
nent board scholars have advocated that board
researchers consider how broad classes of board
attributes other than board independence might
influence firm-level performance outcomes (Daily
et al., 2003; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003).
Board decision control is certainly not the only
role through which outside directors might ulti-
mately influence firm-level performance outcomes.
In their seminal discussion of the central func-
tions of boards of directors, Pfeffer and Salan-
cik (1978) described how outside directors also
play the role of ‘advisors and counselors’ to a
company’s CEO, and at least a few recent dis-
cussions of board effectiveness have considered
1 There is also evidence that independent boards are more likely
to fire the CEO during periods of poor performance (Boeker,
1992), and to select successors who are outsiders (Cannella
and Lubatkin, 1993) or who are demographically different from
their predecessor (Zajac and Westphal, 1996). Extant research
further indicates that firm managers actively seek to minimize
board independence. Westphal and Zajac (1995), for example,
showed how firm managers work to reduce board independence
through their influence over the director selection process, with
significant consequences for executive compensation policy.
Specifically, when boards lacked structural independence from
management, (e.g., due to combining the CEO and board chair
positions), CEOs were better able to appoint demographically
similar new directors who were likely to be biased toward them
in making performance attributions, thus leading to larger pay
increases for the CEO despite mediocre firm performance (see
also Belliveau, O’Reilly, and Wade, 1996). Westphal and Zajac
(1997) provided evidence of a kind of generalized reciprocity
among corporate leaders in which CEOs tend to support each
other’s discretion over corporate policy by resisting the adoption
of board reforms that would enhance the board’s independence
from management at companies where they serve as outside
directors.
how directors might also make substantive contri-
butions to firm performance through the provision
of advice and counsel (e.g., Hillman and Dalziel,
2003; Westphal, 1999). However, there has been
relatively little recent systematic consideration of
specific board member characteristics that would
render directors best able to effectively execute
their advice and counsel functions. Some board
scholars have at least suggested that directors will
be better advisors to the extent that they have
the ‘right’ kinds of knowledge and expertise (e.g.,
Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Carpenter and West-
phal, 2001; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). However,
there have been few, if any, systematic efforts to
conceptually elaborate this basic notion by delin-
eating the nature and sources of directors’ exper-
tise, and by describing how that expertise might be
linked to the relative success of specific firm strate-
gic actions. There have been still fewer empirical
studies of theses issues.2 By extension, little atten-
tion has been given to the boundary conditions
under which director expertise might have stronger
or weaker effects on performance outcomes.
This article seeks to address these important
issues. We draw on the psychological literature
on expertise (see Ericsson and Lehmann, 1996;
VanLehn, 1996 for reviews) and its role in com-
plex decision making by groups (see Bunderson,
2003 for a review) to develop a theoretical model
that delineates how the nature of outside directors’
prior professional experiences, and the knowledge
and expertise they acquire from those experiences,
will influence the performance of a focal firm’s
specific strategic initiatives. Although we believe
that the general principles derived from our the-
ory might be usefully applied to a wide range of
types of strategic actions, in this study we focus
our attention on a specific kind of strategic initia-
tive—firm acquisitions. We focus on acquisition
2 It should be acknowledged here that prior research has con-
sidered a number of kinds of implications of executives’ expe-
riences on other boards that are qualitatively distinct from the
performance effects that we focus on. A study by Westphal and
Zajac (1997), for example, showed how CEOs’ experiences with
board reforms at their own board influenced their willingness
to enact reforms at other boards where they served as outside
directors. Research on the diffusion of corporate policies through
board interlock ties has examined how directors’ knowledge of
specific policies acquired from their experiences on other boards
can explain policy decisions at a focal firm (Haunschild, 1994;
see Mizruchi, 1996 for a review). But it is important to note that
this literature has given little consideration to the performance
implications of directors’ experience on other boards (Finkelstein
and Hambrick, 1996; Westphal and Zajac, 1997).
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performance in part because it might reasonably
be expected that boards will have greater effects
on acquisition performance than overall firm per-
formance, as the latter depends on a wider array of
organizational and environmental factors (Herma-
lin and Weisbach, 2003). A few studies adopting
an organizational learning perspective have consid-
ered how a focal firm’s (and its manager’s) own
prior experiences in making acquisitions influence
the performance of the firm’s subsequent acquisi-
tions (Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999; Hayward,
2002). We consider the separate issue of how
outside directors’ experiences with acquisitions at
other firms, either as directors or as firm managers,
influence the performance of the acquisitions of a
focal firm.3
Our theory describes how the more extensive
and efficiently organized knowledge that outside
directors acquire through their prior experiences
with acquisitions at other firms will enhance their
abilities to successfully meet a number of chal-
lenges that are endemic to acquisition decisions
including information overload, strict time con-
straints, and the need to recognize the long-term
strategic implications of potential focal firm acqui-
sitions. A principal thesis of our theory is that
since psychological research on the development
of expert knowledge indicates that expertise tends
to be specific to relatively narrow knowledge
domains, we should expect that outside directors
will acquire expertise in doing particular kinds
of acquisitions, rather than a general expertise in
undertaking all kinds of acquisitions. Our model
specifically predicts that (1) a firm’s acquisitions
will perform better when firm outside directors
have relatively high levels of experience with mak-
ing acquisitions in the same product markets that a
focal firm is making acquisitions in; (2) high levels
of prior director experience with related acquisition
decisions will be positively associated with the per-
formance of a firm’s related acquisitions, and (3) a
firm’s unrelated acquisitions will perform better
when firm outside directors have significant prior
experience with unrelated acquisitions. All three
of these predictions are supported by our empirical
results.
3 Similarly, while research on corporate acquisitions in the finan-
cial economics and other literatures has considered issues related
to the target firm’s board of directors, only a few studies have
considered the broad issue of the possible effects of attributes of
the board of the acquiring firm (e.g., Byrd and Hickman, 1992;
Subrahmanyam, Rangan, and Rosenstein, 1997).
Our conceptual model, moreover, suggests that,
since research on group decision making indicates
that expertise has the greatest positive effects on
the quality of a group’s decisions when highly
knowledgeable group members have significant
influence on group decision making (Littlepage
et al., 1995; Littlepage, Robison, and Redding-
ton, 1997; see Bunderson, 2003 for a review), we
should expect that the beneficial effects of direc-
tors’ experience with each type of acquisition will
be amplified to the extent that a firm’s board is
independent from management, making it more
willing to intervene in acquisition decision mak-
ing (Johnson, Hoskisson, and Hitt, 1993; Judge
and Zeithaml, 1992; cf., Finkelstein and Hambrick,
1996). All of our theoretical predictions in this
regard are also supported by our empirical ana-
lyses.
This article contributes to the literature on board
effectiveness by being, to the best of our knowl-
edge, the first to develop a theoretical framework
that delineates how the experience and expertise
that outside directors bring to their role as advi-
sors to firm management might enhance the quality
of a firm’s strategic decisions; it is also likely the
first to empirically assess the kinds of effects of
director experience, and resulting expertise, that
are described by our theory. This study is also, by
extension, the first to consider how board indepen-
dence, which has been the main focus of contem-
porary perspectives on board effectiveness, might
function as a moderator of the benefits of relevant
outside director experience and expertise. More
broadly, by considering how and when director
experience and resulting expertise may influence
the performance of corporate acquisitions, our the-
ory and results highlight how scholars interested in
what makes boards effective might fruitfully give
greater systematic attention to directors’ effective-
ness in their advice and counsel role, and thereby
work toward opening up a second main ‘front’ in
research on board effectiveness.
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
The effects of outside director acquisition
experience on firm acquisition performance
We draw on the psychological literature on exper-
tise and its impact on groups’ effectiveness in
making complex decisions to develop our theo-
retical framework. We use this literature to make
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the argument that firms will make higher quality
acquisition decisions to the extent that a firm’s out-
side directors have experience with, and resulting
knowledge and expertise in, decision making about
acquisitions that are similar in important respects
to the ones that are being pursued by a focal firm.
Expertise and complex decision making
Expertise scholars agree that experts possess highly
developed complex decision-making and problem-
solving skills in their domains of expertise, and
that those special capabilities arise from the nature
of the knowledge that experts possess about rele-
vant domains (Ericsson and Charness, 1994; Eric-
sson and Lehman, 1996; Glaser and Chi, 1988;
Sternberg, 1997). Perhaps most obviously, experts
simply have more extensive and complete knowl-
edge about the critical issues in the areas in
which they can claim expertise (Sternberg, 1997).
However, as Sternberg notes in a recent review
of cognitive perspectives on expertise ‘organiza-
tion of knowledge is at least as important as
amount of knowledge in differentiating experts
from novices in a variety of different disciplinary
areas’ (Sternberg, 1997: 153). In particular, expert
knowledge is more efficiently organized into fewer
schema categories with more information in each
category (Lurigio and Carroll, 1985; Sujan, Sujan,
and Bettman, 1988; Day and Lord, 1992). The-
ory and research on the strategies that people use
to find solutions to the challenges they face indi-
cates that people typically work to arrive at effec-
tive problem solutions using two basic strategies:
(1) by applying abstract knowledge about the prob-
lem domain (e.g., abstract knowledge about the
key causal relationships in that domain) to identify
and select problem solutions, and (2) by applying
analogical reasoning, which involves referencing
specific prior challenges that they have faced, to
identify effective solutions to current problems and
avoid ineffective ones (e.g., Anderson, Fincham,
and Douglass, 1997). The kinds of knowledge
experts possess renders them especially effective at
solving problems using both of these basic strate-
gies.
Sometimes there are no suitable examples to
which analogical reasoning can be applied to
identify promising solutions and avoid problem-
atic ones. In such cases, the more extensive and
more efficiently organized abstract knowledge that
experts possess allows them to be especially effec-
tive at solving complex problems through the
application of abstract reasoning. Effective com-
plex decision making through the application of
abstract knowledge depends to some considerable
degree on decision makers’ abilities to sift through
extremely large quantities of information (March,
1994) to (1) accurately define the problem at hand,
(2) identify a range of possible solutions to the
problem, and (3) choose effective solutions from
the ones that they identify. Experts are especially
capable of managing the ‘information overload’
inherent to complex decisions. Experts’ more com-
plete abstract knowledge of a relevant domain,
including more complete mental models of the crit-
ical causal relationships in that domain, enhances
their abilities to separate important from unim-
portant information (Glaser and Chi, 1988; Stern-
berg, 1997). In particular, the more complete and
more efficiently organized abstract knowledge that
experts possess renders them especially able to rec-
ognize meaningful patterns in the complex bodies
of information to which they are exposed (Chase
and Simon, 1973; Glaser and Chi, 1988; Sternberg,
1997). Experts, moreover, have highly developed
abstract knowledge of the key underlying princi-
ples that are critical to effective decision making
in a particular domain (Chi, Feltovich, and Glaser,
1981). Advanced appreciation for these underlying
principles further enhances experts’ capacities for
differentiating between important and unimportant
information.
Complex decisions can be made especially chal-
lenging because they frequently must be made
within strict time constraints. The literature on
expert performance (Glaser and Chi, 1988) and
related management research (Day and Lord, 1992;
Walsh, 1995; Carpenter and Westphal, 2001) indi-
cates that the better organized abstract knowl-
edge possessed by expert decision makers greatly
enhances the speed and accuracy with which
they can process decision-relevant information and
arrive at good solutions. As Glaser and Chi (1988)
suggest, at least part of the reason that experts (e.g.,
chess experts) can make good decisions quickly
is that their more advanced abstract knowledge
allows them to arrive at promising solutions with
substantially less extensive cognitive search than
less expert decision makers must undertake.
Complex decisions are also particularly chal-
lenging because they often require decision makers
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to evaluate the long-term implications of the alter-
natives they are considering. More extensive and
better organized abstract knowledge also leaves
those with relatively high levels of expertise espe-
cially well equipped to recognize the long-term
strategic implications of the alternatives that they
are contemplating. Ericsson and Charness (1994)
cite seminal work on chess expertise (e.g., de
Groot [1946/1978]) in this regard, describing how
chess experts were able to recognize the long-
term implications of alternative moves; using their
highly developed abstract knowledge they ‘system-
atically explored the consequences of promising
moves and the opponent’s likely countermoves by
planning several moves ahead’ (Ericsson and Char-
ness, 1994: 733).
Experts are also especially adept at employing
analogical reasoning to help them arrive at high-
quality problem solutions and avoid ones that are
likely to fail (Reeves and Weisberg, 1994). Ana-
logical reasoning requires decision makers to draw
meaningful comparisons between current chal-
lenges and specific example problems that they
have been exposed to in the past (Reeves and
Weisberg, 1994; Thompson, Gentner, and Loewen-
stein, 2000). Decision makers are better able to
use analogical reasoning to the extent that they
have prior experience with a relatively large num-
ber of relevant example problems that they can
reference (Reeves and Weisberg, 1994). Because,
as we discuss in more detail below, prior experi-
ence is a key source of expert knowledge, experts
almost inevitably have a more extensive men-
tal catalog of relevant prior problems that will
allow them to more effectively apply analogical
reasoning strategies in their efforts to solve cur-
rent problems. Highly developed domain-specific
capacities for analogical reasoning support experts’
abilities to respond to the kinds of special chal-
lenges of solving complex problems, which we
previously described. For example, superior ana-
logical reasoning abilities help experts manage the
time pressures that are often inherent to complex
decisions, especially complex decisions in orga-
nizations. Experts can draw on relevant example
problems that they have been involved in solving
in the past to help them quickly identify effective
solutions to similar current challenges (Ericsson
and Charness, 1994). For example, chess experts
can select effective moves quickly, in large part
because they can reference a large catalog of prior
games and recognize similarities between those
past games and their current situation to directly
identify the ‘right’ move (Glaser and Chi, 1988).
Outside director acquisition expertise and
acquisition decision making
Acquisition decisions are almost inevitably com-
plex, and thus they create all of the significant chal-
lenges for firm leaders that were described above.
Like many high-level strategic choices, acquisi-
tions may involve large amounts of ambiguous
data (Coff, 2003; Jemison and Sitkin, 1986), lead-
ing to information overload. This information must
often be evaluated under considerable time pres-
sure because of concerns regarding secrecy and
competitive bidding (Jemison and Sitkin, 1986).
Outside directors, who must balance their board
duties with a variety of other professional commit-
ments, may find these time constraints particularly
problematic. Acquisition decisions also require
sophisticated, long-term strategic thinking about
how unfolding events may change the value of the
target firm. The target’s value could increase over
time through effective redeployment of resources
(Capron, 1999; Capron, Dussauge, and Mitchell,
1998), but also could decline as a result of cul-
tural conflicts and employee turnover (Buono and
Bowditch, 1985; Greenwood and Hinings, 1994;
Krug and Hegarty, 1997). In acquisition settings,
the ability to anticipate long-term consequences
may be essential to understanding whether a com-
bination will ultimately create value. Thus, effec-
tive acquisition decision making requires leaders
to think dynamically about a variety of future sce-
narios.
The psychological research on expertise just
reviewed suggests that executives with relatively
high levels of expertise in making acquisition
decisions will be especially able to effectively
address these decision-making challenges because
they will possess extensive and efficiently orga-
nized abstract knowledge related to the identifi-
cation and selection of acquisition targets. Direc-
tors with relatively high levels of expertise will
be better able to manage the large quantities of
complex information that are inherent to acqui-
sition decisions. Consistent with prior discussion,
these directors will possess more accurate men-
tal models regarding cause-and-effect relationships
that can help them differentiate information that
is fundamentally important from information that
is largely irrelevant to the acquisition decision at
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hand. Moreover, these directors’ relatively high
levels of expertise will enhance their abilities to
see meaningful patterns in the information about
prospective focal firm acquisitions that they recog-
nize as important. These advantages should help
directors with relatively high levels of expertise
in making acquisition decisions to more effec-
tively manage the ‘information overload’ typical
of those decisions. Expert knowledge should also
help directors to more successfully deal with the
time constraints common in acquisition scenarios.
Consistent with prior discussion, directors’ exper-
tise will enhance the speed and accuracy with
which they can process decision-relevant informa-
tion. Finally, the more extensive and more effi-
ciently organized knowledge that directors with
relatively high levels of acquisition expertise pos-
sess will enhance their abilities to appreciate the
future strategic implications of the acquisitions that
they are called on to evaluate.
Outside directors with significant expertise in
making acquisitions will also be better able to
effectively contribute to a firm’s acquisition deci-
sions because they will possess more fully devel-
oped capacities for identifying promising acqui-
sitions, and avoiding problematic ones, through
processes of analogical reasoning. As we discuss
in more detail below, these directors are likely
to have a more extensive mental catalog of rele-
vant ‘example’ acquisitions that they can draw on
when making current acquisition decisions. High-
expertise directors’ superior capacities for analogi-
cal reasoning will further enhance their abilities to
overcome the key challenges of acquisition deci-
sion making including information overload, strict
time constraints, and the need to recognize the
long-term strategic implications of potential acqui-
sitions.
The discussion to this point would seem to sug-
gest that directors may possess a general expertise
in pursuing acquisitions that will allow them to
make positive contributions to the full range of
a focal firm’s acquisition decisions. The expertise
literature suggests a critical qualifier to this conclu-
sion. A central finding in the expertise literature is
that expertise tends to be specific to relatively nar-
row knowledge domains (Ericsson and Charness,
1994; Ericsson and Lehman, 1996; Glaser and Chi,
1988; Sternberg, 1997). This suggests that execu-
tives are unlikely to possess a general expertise
in undertaking acquisitions of all kinds, but will
instead become experts in making decisions about
particular kinds of acquisitions. In the discussion
that follows, we draw on the extant acquisitions lit-
erature to identify important types of acquisitions
(e.g., related or unrelated), and attendant domains
of knowledge about acquisitions. We argue that,
in order for directors’ acquisition expertise to be
beneficial to a focal firm, that expertise must be
specific to the particular kinds of acquisitions that
the firm is pursuing.
Important domains of outside director
expertise in acquisition decision making
In this section, we make the case that (1) knowl-
edge about acquisitions in specific industries or
product markets, (2) knowledge about related
acquisitions, and (3) knowledge about unrelated
acquisitions represent distinct knowledge domains,
and that, consequently, directors will tend to pos-
sess expertise that is specific to each of these kinds
of acquisitions.
Director expertise in acquiring firms in particular
product markets
The problem-solving abilities required to make
effective acquisition decisions are likely to be at
least partially industry-specific, for several rea-
sons. First, acquisition decisions require detailed
knowledge about the resources and capabilities of
individual target firms within an industry. Second,
the nature of the information that is needed to eval-
uate an acquisition target varies by industry. For
instance, information systems compatibility may
be a key issue when evaluating a target in the
banking industry (Szulanski, 2000), while simi-
larities in professional values may be central for
assessing a target in the professional services sec-
tor (Greenwood and Hinings, 1994). Individuals
who are unfamiliar with an industry may not only
lack information about individual firms, but may
also lack knowledge about what type of informa-
tion would be most relevant. Third, the capabilities
required to effectively negotiate an acquisition deal
are also likely to vary by industry. For exam-
ple, acquirers of knowledge-intensive firms may
benefit from capabilities in designing performance-
contingent deal structures (Coff, 1999). Because
knowledge about acquisitions in particular markets
represent distinct knowledge domains, executives
will tend to develop expertise in undertaking deci-
sions about acquisitions that is specific to particular
industries or product markets.
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Director expertise in related and unrelated
acquisitions
The abilities required to make effective acquisi-
tion decisions are also likely to vary according to
whether the target’s industry is related or unre-
lated to the buyer’s. Related and unrelated acqui-
sitions depend on distinct sources of value, which
may require different skills to recognize and evalu-
ate. Value creation in related acquisitions typically
stems from operational synergies (i.e., scale or
scope economies) and/or enhanced market power
(Baumol, 1982; Scherer and Ross, 1990; Teece,
1980), while value creation in unrelated acquisi-
tions depends on the realization of managerial or
financial synergies (e.g., the diversification of earn-
ings risk) (Jensen, 1986; Levy and Sarnat, 1970;
Lewellen, 1971).4 Related acquisitions may, as a
result, require a greater degree of integration to
realize their value, which demands increased atten-
tion to such issues as cultural compatibility dur-
ing the decision process (Datta and Grant, 1990;
Graebner, 2004; Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991;
Jemison and Sitkin, 1986). Because related and
unrelated acquisitions represent distinct knowledge
domains, we should expect that some directors
are likely to develop expert knowledge in pursu-
ing related acquisitions, while others will develop
expertise in undertaking unrelated acquisitions.
(Some directors may possess expertise in both
kinds of acquisition decisions).
Individual outside director acquisition
expertise and firm acquisition decision making
At this juncture, it is important to at least briefly
consider how individual director’s acquisition
expertise, which has been the focus of the dis-
cussion to this point, will come to be manifested
in the quality of a firm’s actual acquisition deci-
sions. While prevailing theory often emphasizes
the ‘decision control’ role of outside directors, and
at least implicitly suggests that outside directors’
are only involved in the ratification (or rejection)
of strategic initiatives proposed by firm managers,
a number of board scholars (e.g., Westphal, 1999;
4 Some scholars have suggested that unrelated acquisitions offer
few potential synergies relative to related acquisitions (Scherer
and Ross, 1990; Wernerfelt, 1984). However, the empirical
evidence regarding the performance of related vs. unrelated
acquisitions is inconclusive, with most variance occurring within
rather than between the two categories (see King et al. 2004).
Hillman and Dalziel, 2003) point out that direc-
tors routinely have more extensive involvement in
strategic decision making. In the case of acquisi-
tion decisions, for example, directors may propose
acquisition targets rather than simply approving (or
rejecting) target firms proposed by management.
Along similar lines, a number of board scholars
have recently highlighted the usefulness of con-
ceptualizing boards of directors as decision making
groups (e.g., Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Hillman
and Dalziel, 2003), in which outside directors share
strategic decision-making responsibilities with firm
managers.
Conceptualizing boards as decision-making
groups allows us to bring insights from psycho-
logical research on the role of expertise in group
performance to bear on the question of how the
expertise possessed by individual outside directors
ultimately impacts the quality of a firm’s acquisi-
tion decisions. Influential theories of group perfor-
mance (Hackman, 1987; Steiner, 1972) argue that
the quality of group decision making is determined
to some considerable degree by the extent to which
group members collectively possess relevant pro-
ductive resources. In groups involved in making
complex decisions, knowledge resources are espe-
cially critical (Faraj and Sproull, 2000; McGrath,
1984; Littlepage et al., 1997). Relevant studies
indicate that groups make better decisions to the
extent that their individual members collectively
have relatively high levels of relevant task knowl-
edge and expertise (for reviews, see McGrath,
1984; Kerr and Tindale, 2004). In prior research,
including careful recent studies of the issue, schol-
ars have routinely conceptualized, and empirically
assessed, group experience and expertise as the
sum of the experience or expertise of a group’s
individual members (e.g., Faraj and Sproull, 2000;
Reagans, Argote, and Brooks, 2005). We employ
this conceptual approach in the present study.
Director acquisition experience as a source of
director acquisition expertise
How might directors acquire expertise in doing
the specific kinds of acquisitions (e.g., related and
unrelated acquisitions) discussed above? The con-
temporary expertise literature emphasizes the role
of experience in the development of expertise,
and currently influential theories of expert per-
formance argue that experience with a particular
kind of decision is the primary contributor to the
Copyright  2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strat. Mgmt. J., 29: 1155–1177 (2008)
DOI: 10.1002/smj
1162 M. L. McDonald, J. D. Westphal, and M. E. Graebner
development of expert knowledge in undertaking
that type of decision (see Ericsson and Charness,
1994; 1997; Ericsson and Lehmann, 1996; Van-
Lehn, 1996 for reviews of the supporting litera-
ture). Thus, there is widespread agreement among
expertise researchers that decision makers tend
to accumulate expert knowledge in a particular
domain to the extent that they have previously been
involved in a significant number of decisions in
that domain (Ericsson and Charness, 1994; 1997;
Ericsson and Lehmann, 1996; VanLehn, 1996).
With increasing experience in a particular
domain, decision makers accumulate both gen-
eral and specific knowledge about that domain
(Ericsson and Charness, 1994; 1997; Ericsson and
Lehmann, 1996; VanLehn, 1996). Thus, experience
is a critical contributor to the kind of extensive
knowledge base that marks relatively high levels of
expertise, and that supports high quality decision
making. Greater experience also leads to a more
complete understanding of cause-and-effect rela-
tions in a particular domain; promotes more com-
plete abilities to distinguish decision-relevant from
decision-irrelevant information; and facilitates the
development of more effectively organized knowl-
edge (Ericsson and Charness, 1994; 1997; Ericsson
and Lehmann, 1996; VanLehn, 1996). As previ-
ously described, these efficiencies in the organiza-
tion of knowledge support effective decision mak-
ing by promoting experts’ abilities to use abstract
reasoning to (1) effectively differentiate between
important and unimportant information, (2) make
important judgments with greater speed and accu-
racy, and (3) effectively assess the strategic impli-
cations of a particular course of action. Experience
with making decisions in a particular domain also
expands the catalog of prior decisions that indi-
viduals can draw on as they seek to attack current
problems, and thus experience enhances individu-
als’ abilities to solve problems using analogical
reasoning. Recall that decision makers are bet-
ter able to use analogical reasoning to effectively
solve the problems they encounter to the extent
that they have prior experience with a significant
number of relevant example problems that they can
reference (Reeves and Weisberg, 1994).
The above discussion indicates that directors
will accumulate expertise in making distinct kinds
of acquisitions (e.g., unrelated acquisitions) to the
extent that they were involved in a compara-
tively large number of acquisitions of a particu-
lar type (e.g., unrelated acquisitions) in the past.
With increasing experience with a particular kind
of acquisition, directors will become more knowl-
edgeable about the critical elements of that type of
acquisition. Experience will also contribute to bet-
ter organized knowledge about specific kinds of
acquisitions that will enhance directors’ acquisi-
tion decision-making abilities by enhancing their
capacities to cope with a number of challenges
that are endemic to acquisition decisions includ-
ing (1) information overload, (2) strict time con-
straints, and (3) the need to recognize the long-
term strategic implications of potential acquisi-
tions. Greater prior experience will also contribute
to outside directors’ abilities to effectively employ
analogical reasoning to make constructive contri-
butions to specific types of current firm acquisition
decisions because it will, by definition, expand the
catalog of acquisitions of a particular kind that
directors can draw on.5
Combined with prior discussion regarding the
distinct domains of acquisition knowledge, the
above argument suggests that outside directors will
develop expert knowledge that can be usefully
applied to enhance the quality of a focal firm’s
acquisition decisions to the extent that directors
have been previously involved in pursuing acqui-
sitions in the same industries or product markets in
which the focal firm is currently pursuing acquisi-
tions. Thus, we offer the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1a (H1a): There will be a positive
relationship between outside directors’ prior
experience with acquisitions in the same prod-
uct markets as a focal firm’s acquisitions and
the performance of the firm’s acquisitions.
We similarly expect that outside directors will
develop expert knowledge in making related acqui-
sitions that will have positive effects on the perfor-
mance of a firm’s related acquisitions to the extent
5 It should be recognized that the literature on learning from
experience provides additional support for the basic proposition
that prior experience with making particular types of acquisitions
will enhance directors’ abilities to make constructive contribu-
tions to a focal firm’s acquisition decisions of a specific type.
Organizational learning scholars have argued that firm managers
can apply lessons from prior acquisition decisions to decisions
about current acquisitions to the extent that there are important
similarities between past and present acquisitions (Haleblian and
Finkelstein, 1999). Relevant empirical studies (e.g., Haleblian
and Finkelstein, 1999; Hayward, 2002) have found a positive
relationship between a firm’s prior experience with acquisitions
that are similar in important respects to current acquisitions and
the performance of a firm’s current acquisitions.
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that they have been involved in a relatively large
number of related acquisitions in the past, either
as firm executives, or as outside directors at other
companies. This suggests the following hypothe-
sis:
Hypothesis 1b (H1b): There will be a positive
relationship between outside directors’ prior
experience with related acquisitions and the per-
formance of the firm’s related acquisitions.
Finally, outside directors will develop expert
knowledge in pursuing unrelated acquisitions that
will benefit the performance of a firm’s unrelated
acquisitions to the extent that they have been
involved in a relatively large number of unrelated
acquisitions in the past. This points to the follow-
ing hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1c (H1c): There will be a positive
relationship between outside directors’ experi-
ence with unrelated acquisitions and the perfor-
mance of the firm’s unrelated acquisitions.
Board independence as a moderator of the
effects of outside director acquisition
experience on firm acquisition performance
In this section we draw on additional insights from
psychological research on expertise and its role in
group decision making to argue that board inde-
pendence will amplify the previously proposed
positive effects of director acquisition expertise
on firm acquisition performance. The broad intu-
itive rationale for this proposition is the relatively
straightforward notion that outside director exper-
tise will have more potent positive effects on the
quality of a firm’s acquisition decisions to the
extent that outside directors exercise significant
influence over the content of those decisions. As
we argue in more detail below, the extant evidence
indicates that board independence increases direc-
tors’ capacities to influence a firm’s strategic deci-
sions, including the firm’s acquisition decisions.
Psychological research on the role of expertise
in group decision making provides more specific
and theoretically rigorous support for the general
proposition that director expertise will be more
beneficial to the extent that highly expert out-
side directors exercise influence over firm strate-
gic decision making. Relevant research suggests
that groups often make surprisingly poor use of
the relevant expertise that their members possess
(Littlepage et al., 1995; Littlepage and Mueller,
1997; Littlepage et al., 1997). Scholars studying
the conditions under which expertise is most fully
exploited have concluded that the relative influence
of high expertise members is of special impor-
tance. As Bunderson (2003) argues, ‘by . . . align-
ing intragroup influence with members’ expertise,
groups are better able to translate the expertise
of their members into higher-quality solutions and
decisions.’ (Bunderson, 2003: 557). Extant empir-
ical studies have consistently demonstrated that
high levels of group member expertise have more
potent positive effects on decision making quality
to the extent that high-expertise group members
also have relatively high levels of influence on
group decisions (e.g., Littlepage et al., 1995; Lit-
tlepage et al., 1997; see Bunderson, 2003 for a
review). When high-expertise group members are
unable to substantively shape final decisions, the
quality of a group’s decisions suffers.
The theory and research reviewed here would
suggest that high levels of outside director acqui-
sition expertise will have the greatest positive
effects on firm acquisition performance when out-
side directors are willing and able to exercise
relatively high levels of influence over acquisi-
tion decisions. A number of studies indicate that
board members are more actively involved in, and
thus exercise greater influence over, strategic deci-
sions to the extent that they are independent from
management (e.g., Johnson et al., 1993; Judge and
Zeithaml, 1992). While this argument emphasizes
how board independence will amplify the effects of
director experience, relevant strategic experience
of directors could also amplify the effects of board
independence. Strategic input from independent
directors with high levels of relevant experience
might be more credible to CEOs. Thus, indepen-
dent boards with high levels of relevant experience
might engender less reactance from CEOs, which
has been identified in past research as a signifi-
cant behavioral side effect of reforms that increase
board independence (cf. Westphal, 1998).
Combining the above line of reasoning with
prior discussion regarding the important domains
of acquisition decision making suggests a specific
set of testable hypotheses. In particular, we antici-
pate that the positive relationship between director
expertise in undertaking acquisitions in the same
product markets in which a focal firm is pursuing
acquisitions will be more positive to the extent that
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the firm’s board is independent from management.
This suggests the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2a (H2a): The positive relation-
ship between outside directors’ experience with
acquisitions in the same product markets as a
focal firm’s acquisitions and the performance of
the firm’s acquisitions will be more positive to
the extent the firm’s board is independent from
management.
We, moreover, expect that director expertise
in related acquisitions will have greater positive
effects on the performance of a firm’s related
acquisitions to the extent that the firm’s board is
independent from management. Thus, we offer the
following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2b (H2b): The positive relation-
ship between outside directors’ experience with
related acquisitions and the performance of a
firm’s related acquisitions will be more positive
to the extent the firm’s board is independent from
management.
Finally, we expect that board independence will
strengthen the positive link between director exper-
tise in unrelated acquisitions and the quality of a
firm’s decisions regarding unrelated acquisitions.
This suggests the hypothesis below:
Hypothesis 2c (H2c): The positive relationship
between outside directors’ experience with unre-
lated acquisitions and the performance of a
firm’s unrelated acquisitions will be more posi-
tive to the extent the firm’s board is independent
from management.
METHOD
Sample and data collection
The sample frame for this study includes acquisi-
tions made by large and medium-sized U.S. indus-
trial and service firms listed in the 1988 Forbes
and Fortune 500 indexes during the period 1989
to 1998, inclusive. Acquisitions were excluded
from the sample if complete data on board and
firm characteristics were unavailable. The final
sample included 1,916 acquisitions made by 489
firms. We conducted Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-
sample tests to determine whether this sample dif-
fered from the larger sample frame of acquisitions
by Fortune/Forbes 500 firms (Siegel and Castel-
lan, 1988). There were no significant differences
between the initial and final samples with respect
to the dependent variable (i.e., excess stock returns
from the acquisition) or any of the control variables
(e.g., acquisition size, performance of the acquiring
firm, number of prior acquisitions by the acquiring
firm, etc.).
We obtained data on board characteristics and
ownership from Disclosure, Inc.’s Compact Dis-
closure database, Standard & Poor’s Register of
Corporations, Directors, and Executives, and cor-
porate proxy statements. Data on financial and
operating characteristics came from COMPUS-
TAT. We obtained acquisition data from COMPU-
STAT and the Securities Data Corporation.
Dependent variable
We measured focal acquisition performance in
terms of excess stock returns, or the difference
between the acquiring firm’s observed return and
its expected return during a specified period of
time surrounding the acquisition announcement
(Patell, 1976; Brown and Warner, 1985). This mea-
sure has been widely used in the acquisitions lit-
erature (King et al., 2004). Moreover, abnormal
announcement returns have been associated with
longer-term measures of acquisition performance,
including operating cash flows (Healy, Palepu,
and Ruback, 1992) and likelihood of divestiture
(Kaplan and Wiesbach, 1992).
In the absence of stock price effects from
the acquisition announcement, stock returns are
described by the following market model (Patell,
1976; Gaver, Gaver, and Battistel, 1992):
Rjt = αj + βjRmt + εjt
where Rjt is the return for firm j on day t, Rmt
is the market return on day t, βj is the beta or
market-adjusted variance in stock returns for firm
j, αj is the rate of return for firm j when Rmt is
zero, and εjt is a serially independent disturbance
term [E(εjt) = 0]. The parameters of the market
model (αj and βj) are estimated over a 238-day
period (day t − 259 to day t − 21, where t signifies
the announcement date) (Gaver et al., 1992). The
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excess return (ejt) from each acquisition is then
given by:
ejt = Rjt − aj − bjRmt,
where aj and bj are least squares estimates of αj
and βj. In effect, this measure gauges a firm’s
stock returns on a particular day in excess of the
returns that would have been expected based on
the returns of companies with similar betas. We
corrected for heteroskedasticity using the Jaffe-
Mandelker portfolio method (Binder, 1998).
We ran the analyses using several different event
periods, where the event period designates the
period of time over which excess returns are cumu-
lated. In the primary analysis, however, we esti-
mated excess returns over a two-day period (t−1
to t0). While longer event periods allow for the
gradual diffusion of information about an event
following announcement, research has shown that
prices generally adjust to the announcement of sig-
nificant corporate events such as corporate acquisi-
tions very quickly (e.g., within 15 minutes [Dann,
Mayers, and Raab, 1977; Ryngaert and Netter,
1990]). Moreover, with longer event periods there
is a higher likelihood of contamination from extra-
neous events. Nevertheless, we ran separate analy-
ses using an 11-day event period (t−5 to t+5) and a
31-day event period (t−5 to t+25), and the hypoth-
esized results presented below were substantively
unchanged.
Following many prior studies, in the primary
analyses we coded acquisitions as related when
the primary two-digit Standard Industrial Classifi-
cation (SIC) code of the acquiring firm matched
that of the acquired firm (Fowler and Schmidt,
1989; Krishnan, Miller, and Judge, 1997; Kroll
et al., 1997); all other acquisitions were coded as
unrelated. In separate analyses we coded acqui-
sitions as related when (i) the primary four-digit
SIC code of the acquiring firm matched that of the
acquired firm (Hayward, 2002), (ii) the primary
NAICS (North American Industry Classification
System) code of the acquiring firm matched that of
the acquired firm, (iii) the acquiring and acquired
firms had at least one four-digit SIC code in com-
mon among the top six lines of business in which
they operated, or (iv) the acquiring and acquired
firms had at least one NAICS code in common
among the top six lines of business in which they
operated. In each of these supplementary mod-
els, the hypothesized results were substantively
unchanged from the results presented below.
Independent variables
We measured outside directors’ prior experience
with decisions about acquiring firms in the same
product market as the focal acquisition as:
M t − 8 N
  (Asy,f)
d = 1 y = t − 1 f = 1
where As indicates an acquisition of a company
that has the same primary two-digit SIC code as
the acquired firm in the focal acquisition at the
N firms where the individual served as manager
or director in year y (t indicates the time of the
survey), and M indicates the number of outside
directors on the board making the focal acquisition.
In separate models we measured A as acquisition
of a company that has (i) the same primary four-
digit SIC code as the acquired firm in the focal
acquisition, (ii) the same primary NAICS code as
the acquired firm in the focal acquisition (iii) at
least one four-digit SIC code in common with the
acquired firm in the focal acquisition among the
top six lines of business in which they operated,
(iii) at least one NAICS code in common with the
acquired firm in the focal acquisition among the
top six lines of business in which they operated. In
each of these models the results were unchanged.
We measured directors’ prior experience with
decisions about related acquisitions as:
M t − 8 N
  (Ary,f)
d = 1 y = t − 1 f = 1
where Ar indicates an acquisition of a company
that has the same primary two-digit SIC code as
acquiring firm f at the N firms where the focal
individual served as manager or director in year y,
and M indicates the number of outside directors
on the board making the focal acquisition. In
separate models, we measured Ar as acquisition
of a company that has (i) the same primary four-
digit SIC code as the acquiring firm f, (ii) the
same primary NAICS code as the acquiring firm
(iii) at least one four-digit SIC code in common
with the acquiring firm among the top six lines of
business in which they operated, (iii) at least one
NAICS code in common with the acquiring firm
among the top six lines of business in which they
operated. In each of these models the results were
unchanged. We developed an analogous measure
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to operationalize directors’ prior experience with
decisions about unrelated acquisitions.
Our approach to aggregating board member
experience is guided by prior research on how
the expertise of group members affects group per-
formance, which has typically aggregated group
member experience or expertise by summing the
relevant characteristics of individual group mem-
bers (for reviews, see McGrath, 1984; Kerr and
Tindale, 2004). In separate analyses we tried sev-
eral alternative approaches to aggregation (e.g., the
mean or median level of experience, experience
weighted by indicators of director status, such as
number of board appointments held by the direc-
tor, and experience weighted by the market returns
of experienced acquisitions). Each of these alter-
native approaches to aggregation reduced the fit of
our empirical models. We used four different indi-
cators of board independence from management
that have been widely used in the governance liter-
ature (for reviews, see Finkelstein and Hambrick,
1996; Westphal and Zajac, 1998; Chatterjee and
Harrison, 2001): the ratio of outside to inside direc-
tors; the portion of outside directors appointed after
the CEO; separation of the CEO and board chair
positions; and outside director stock ownership.
The ratio of outside to inside directors partially
determines the board’s formal independence from
top management. Nonemployee directors are less
beholden to CEOs than inside directors (Boeker,
1992; Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996), and should
therefore be more willing to challenge strategic
proposals put forth by the CEO. Thus, when out-
siders hold a relatively large portion of board seats,
norms of director conduct should tend to moti-
vate decision control by board members. As noted
above, there is some evidence that the outsider
ratio predicts the extent to which boards intervene
in the strategic decision-making process (Judge
and Zeithaml, 1992; Johnson et al., 1993). Sep-
aration of the CEO and board chair positions also
enhances the board’s formal independence from
management. It is thought that directors will be
less inclined to challenge management proposals
when the CEO serves as board chair than when an
outsider presides over the board (Harrison, Torres,
and Kukalis, 1988; Cannella and Lubatkin, 1993;
Daily and Dalton, 1994; Finkelstein and Hambrick,
1996; Sanders and Carpenter, 1998). Consistent
with this proposition, Westphal (1999) found evi-
dence for a strong, positive association between
CEO-board chair separation and subsequent board
monitoring of strategic decision making.
The portion of outside directors appointed after
the CEO, is thought to indicate the degree to which
a firm’s board is socially independent from man-
agement; social independence is reduced to the
extent that a significant number of directors were
appointed after the CEO came to his or her posi-
tion. There is considerable evidence that CEOs use
their control of the director nomination process to
select outsiders who are personal friends, demo-
graphically similar, or otherwise sympathetic to
them (for a review, see Finkelstein and Hambrick,
1996). Moreover, outsiders may feel beholden to
CEOs for appointing them to the board (Wade,
O’Reilly, and Chandratat, 1990). Accordingly, out-
siders appointed by the CEO may be less indepen-
dent of management, and less inclined to challenge
management proposals, than outsiders appointed
by a previous CEO. Finally, outside director stock
ownership should enhance the board’s indepen-
dence from management. Stock ownership aligns
the interests of directors with the interests of share-
holders, and should therefore motivate directors to
block management proposals that they believe do
not further shareholder interests (Finkelstein and
Hambrick, 1996; Hambrick and Jackson, 2000;
Ho, Lam, and Sami, 2004). In fact, Johnson et al.
(1993) found strong evidence that outside direc-
tor ownership increases the tendency for boards to
intervene in the strategic decision-making process,
and Westphal (1999) found a positive association
between director ownership and board monitoring
of strategic decision making. This variable is mea-
sured as the percentage of total common equity
held by outside directors.
All four indicators of board independence were
measured for the year prior to the acquisition
announcement. We combined the four indicators
into a single index using principal components
analysis (Jackson, 1991). It is appropriate to apply
a data reduction technique such as principal com-
ponents to causal (vs. reflective) indicators (Mac-
Callum and Browne, 1993). Although causal indi-
cators need not be correlated with one another, fac-
tor analysis showed that all four indicators loaded
on one factor with an eigenvalue greater than one.
In separate analyses we also included the portion of
outside directors who were affiliated with the focal
firm by family or business relationship as a fifth
indicator of board independence (cf. Daily, 1996),
and the hypothesized results displayed below were
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unchanged. Moreover, we also ran separate mod-
els in which each indicator of board independence
was entered separately, and again the hypothesized
results were substantively unchanged.
We tested the hypothesized interactions between
the director experience variables and board inde-
pendence using the product-term approach. Com-
ponents of the interaction terms were centered
to avoid multicollinearity. This procedure yielded
three interaction terms:
(i) Director experience with acquisitions in the
same product market as the focal acquisition
X board independence;
(ii) Director experience with related acquisitions
X board independence;
(iii) Director experience with unrelated acquisi-
tions X board independence.
In the interest of thoroughness, we ran supple-
mentary models that assessed the separate mod-
erating effects of each of the components of our
composite board independence variable. Taken as
a whole, results from these additional analyses
were generally consistent with the results we report
below, although we note that the moderating effect
of the ratio of outside to inside directors was
weaker than the impact of the other three indicators
of independence we employed.
Control variables
We controlled for a range of financial, organiza-
tional, and macroeconomic factors that could influ-
ence acquisition performance. First, we controlled
for the size of the acquiring firm and the target
firm, with size measured as log of total assets (‘Log
of acquiring firm size’; ‘Log of target size’) (Beck-
man and Haunschild, 2002). In separate models
we controlled for the ratio of acquiring firm size
to target firm size and the results were identical to
those displayed below. We also controlled for the
financial slack of the acquiring firm. The literature
on corporate acquisitions suggests that slack could
influence acquisition performance, although prior
research is inconclusive about the directionality of
this relationship (Jensen, 1986; Hitt et al., 1993;
Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999). We included two
measures of slack in the models: the debt-to-equity
ratio, which is inversely related to slack, and free
cash flow. Moreover, we controlled for the prof-
itability of the acquiring firm, measured as return
on assets.
An agency theory perspective suggests that sig-
nificant ownership by institutional investors may
improve the quality of acquisition decisions. In
this light, we controlled for the level of owner-
ship by institutional investors (‘institutional own-
ership’), measured as the number of shares held
by pension funds, banks and trust companies, sav-
ings and loans, mutual fund managers, and labor
union funds, divided by total common stock. Sev-
eral scholars have posited that firm-level experi-
ence in making acquisitions could influence acqui-
sition performance, although empirical evidence
is mixed. Thus, we controlled for the number
of acquisitions completed by the focal firm dur-
ing the prior eight-year period (‘prior acquisitions
of focal firm’) (Beckman and Haunschild, 2002).
This variable also serves as a more general con-
trol for possible sources of unobserved hetero-
geneity (Gulati, 1995; Beckman and Haunschild,
2002). In separate models we used alternative
specifications of firm-level acquisition experience,
including: (i) experience with related vs. unre-
lated acquisitions; (ii) similar acquisition experi-
ence, measured as the proportion of prior acquisi-
tions that shared the same four-digit SIC code as
the focal acquisition (Haunschild, 1994; Haleblian
and Finkelstein, 1999); (iii) the similarity of prior
acquisitions, measured as the percentage of prior
acquisitions in the firm’s primary four-digit SIC
code (Hayward, 2002); and (iv) curvilinear speci-
fications of each of these experience variables. The
hypothesized results were unchanged in each of
these supplementary models.
We also controlled for the total acquisition expe-
rience of outside directors (‘total director experi-
ence’) (i.e., directors’ combined experience with
related and unrelated acquisitions). We also ran
separate models that included measures of inside
director experience with acquisitions at other firms
that paralleled the measures of outside direc-
tor experience discussed above. The hypothesized
results were substantively unchanged with these
controls included in the models. Moreover, we
controlled for period effects by including dummy
variables for the N-1 years in which acquisitions
were made, and we controlled for industry effects
by including dummies for the N-1 primary (two-
digit) SIC codes of acquiring firms in the sample
(to conserve space, coefficients for these variables
are not displayed in the tables). In separate mod-
els we included dummy variables for acquired
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firms’ industries, and the hypothesized results were
unchanged.
Prior studies of corporate acquisitions have
examined how certain characteristics of the ‘deal’
or transaction might influence acquisition perfor-
mance. For example, while the evidence is mixed,
some studies have found that the fraction of the
acquisition price paid in the acquiring firm’s stock
has negative effects on acquisition performance
(Datta and Grant, 1990; Haleblian and Finkelstein,
1999). We therefore controlled for the form of
consideration in the focal deal, measured as the
percentage of the acquisition paid in the acquir-
ing firm’s common stock. It has also been sug-
gested that factors like the number of other bid-
ding firms, and whether a takeover is hostile (or
not), can impact acquisition returns. We ran sepa-
rate models with each of these variables included;
there were no changes in the hypothesized results
reported below. Moreover, the results were also
unchanged when we controlled for other major pol-
icy announcements and publicized incidents that
occurred during the event period (see McWilliams
and Siegel, 1997: 640). Control variables were
lagged by one year.
Analysis
We used multiple regression analysis to estimate
excess returns from the announcement of corporate
acquisitions. While event studies in the financial
economics literature typically assess the effects
of independent variables on excess returns using
subgroup analyses, several authors have recom-
mended the use of multiple regression to con-
trol for possible third variables (e.g., McWilliams
and Siegel, 1997). We estimated excess returns
for three different samples to test our hypotheses:
the sample of related acquisitions (N = 779), the
sample of unrelated acquisitions (N = 1137), and
the sample of all acquisitions (N = 1916). Given
that our data has a time series component, we
used the Cochrane-Orcutt transformation to correct
for autocorrelation (results were unchanged using
the Prais-Winsten method) (Johnston and DiNardo
1997). While several of our control variables help
to address possible sources of unobserved hetero-
geneity in the data (e.g., prior acquisitions by the
focal firm and prior performance), in the interest of
thoroughness we also conducted separate analyses
using fixed-effects models to control for possi-
ble confounds related to unobserved heterogeneity
(Greene, 1993). The hypothesized results discussed
below remained strongly significant, suggesting
that unobserved heterogeneity is not confounding
our findings.
RESULTS
Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations are
included in Table 1. Table 2 shows the results
of Cochrane-Orcutt regression analyses of excess
stock returns from corporate acquisitions.6
Hypothesis 1a predicted a positive relationship
between the number of acquisitions that outside
directors have previously been involved in that
are in the same markets as the acquisitions under-
taken by a focal firm and the performance of
the focal firm’s recent acquisitions. Hypothesis 1a
is supported. The results in Model 1 of Table 2
show a significant positive relationship between
directors’ experience with acquisitions in related
markets and the excess returns associated with a
firm’s acquisitions (p < 0.05). Hypothesis 1b is
also supported. The results in Model 3 of Table 2
indicate a significant positive relationship between
outside director experience with related acquisi-
tions and the performance of a firm’s related
acquisitions (p < 0.01). Hypothesis 1c posited a
positive relationship between directors’ experi-
ence with unrelated acquisitions and the excess
returns from a firm’s unrelated acquisitions. The
results in Model 5 support Hypothesis 1c (p <
0.05).
Table 2 also contains statistical findings rele-
vant to our second set of hypotheses, which made
predictions about how board independence from
management would likely moderate the effects
posited in Hypotheses 1a -1c. Hypothesis 2a pre-
dicted that board independence would moderate
the link between directors’ experience with acqui-
sitions in markets similar to those in which a
focal firm is pursuing acquisitions and the per-
formance of a firm’s acquisitions, such that the
relationship would be more positive for firms
with independent boards. The results in Model 2
strongly support this hypothesis. The relevant two-
way interaction between director experience with
6 There is no evidence for multicollinearity in the models: the
highest variance inflation factor (VIF) was less than 10, and the
mean VIF was not significantly greater than one in any of the
models (Chatterjee, Hadi, and Price, 2000).
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Table 2. Cochrane-Orcutt regression analyses of excess stock returns from corporate acquisitions




Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Dir. experience with acquisitions in related 0.019∗ 0.019∗ 0.032∗ 0.030∗ 0.015∗ 0.015†
markets (0.008) (0.008) (0.013) (0.013) (0.007) (0.008)
Dir. experience with related acquisitions 0.009 0.008 0.039∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.005 0.006
(0.006) (0.006) (0.015) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011)
Dir. experience with unrelated acquisitions −0.007 −0.008 −0.017† −0.017† 0.013∗ 0.014∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
Board independence from management 0.024 0.023 0.037 0.051 0.020 0.021
(0.024) (0.023) (0.038) (0.047) (0.027) (0.029)
Dir. experience with acquisitions in related 0.018∗∗
markets X Board independence (0.006)
Dir. experience with related acquisitions X 0.330∗ 0.048
Board independence (0.169) (0.111)
Dir. experience with unrelated acquisitions X −0.132 0.262∗∗
Board independence (0.088) (0.106)
Return on assets 0.183 0.201 0.121 0.098 0.060 0.058
(0.181) (0.180) (0.418) (0.427) (0.195) (0.192)
Debt-to-equity 0.0004 0.0003 0.0006 0.0006 0.0005 0.0005†
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Free cash flow −0.00002∗ −0.00031∗ −0.0005∗ −0.0005∗ −0.0004∗ −0.0003†
(0.00001) (0.00014) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Log of acquiring firm size −0.005 −0.007 −0.002 −0.002 −0.007 −0.004
(0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Log of target size −0.010∗∗ −0.010∗∗ −0.015∗ −0.017∗ −0.014∗∗∗ −0.014∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004)
Prior acquisitions of focal firm −0.0059∗∗ −0.0064∗∗ −0.010∗ −0.010∗ −0.007∗ −0.007∗
(0.0024) (0.0025) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Total director experience −0.001 −0.001 −0.0019 −0.0020 −0.001 −0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.001) (0.001)
Institutional ownership 0.130 0.123 0.283 0.288 0.071 0.030
(0.213) (.207) (0.195) (0.187) (0.173) (0.174)
Stock consideration 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Constant −0.025 −0.006 −0.145 −0.179 0.006 0.037
(0.066) (0.063) (0.174) (0.132) (0.068) (0.069)
F (Wald test) 4.37∗∗∗ 7.55∗∗∗ 3.56∗∗∗ 6.99∗∗∗ 3.31∗∗ 5.92∗∗∗
R2 0.30 0.44 0.27 0.44 0.20 0.35
N 1916 1916 779 779 1137 1137
acquisitions in related markets and board indepen-
dence is positive and statistically significant (p <
0.01). Hypothesis 2b is also supported. Hypoth-
esis 2b posited that board independence would
amplify the positive effects of directors’ experi-
ence with related acquisitions on the performance
of a firm’s related acquisitions, and the relevant
two-way interaction in Model 4 between direc-
tor experience with related acquisitions and board
independence is positive and statistically signifi-
cant (p < 0.05). There is, moreover, strong support
for Hypothesis 2c, which predicted that board inde-
pendence would amplify the positive relationship
between the directors’ experience with unrelated
acquisitions and the excess returns associated with
a focal firm’s unrelated acquisitions. The results
in Model 6 show that the relevant two-way inter-
action term is positive and statistically significant
(p < 0.01).
It is interesting to note that the results con-
sistently fail to support the broad proposition
that firms will make better acquisition decisions
when their boards are independent from manage-
ment. The relevant results in Models 1, 3, and 5
show insignificant main effects of board indepen-
dence on the performance of (1) all of a firm’s
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acquisitions, (2) a firm’s related acquisitions, and
(3) a firm’s unrelated acquisitions.7
DISCUSSION
The prevailing view in much popular and aca-
demic writings on the question of what makes
boards effective has been that board independence
from management is the principal determinant of
the performance effects of boards. Agency theo-
rists and others argue that independent directors
will show the greatest tendencies to intervene to
block management-proposed actions that they view
as ill -advised, and thus they will be more effec-
tive at preventing managers from pursuing their
own personal interests at the expense of share-
holder objectives. However, the intuitive appeal of
prevailing academic theory and popular wisdom
notwithstanding, a now extensive body of empir-
ical evidence indicates that board independence
does not have consistent positive firm-level per-
formance effects. Thus, there exists something of
an impasse in the contemporary board effective-
ness literature. A number of board scholars have
recently observed that the time is, therefore, ripe
both for considering how other factors influence
board effectiveness, and for bringing alternative
theoretical perspectives to the critical question of
what renders boards effective (Daily et al., 2003;
Hillman and Dalziel, 2003).
Prior work on the basic functions of boards of
directors has suggested that the other main role of
outside directors’ is the provision of advice and
counsel to firm managers (Pfeffer and Salancik,
1978). However, comparatively little attention has
been given to factors that might enhance directors’
abilities to provide valuable advice and counsel
(i.e., advice and counsel that helps the focal firm
to perform better). Some scholars have at least
7 It should be noted that some results from the small number of
other studies that have examined the main effects of acquiring
firm board independence on acquisition performance suggest a
more complicated picture. Byrd and Hickman (1992) reported
a curvilinear relationship between the number of independent
directors on the board and the performance of a firm’s acquisi-
tions. Subrahmanyam, et al. (1997) found that one indicator of
independence, the proportion of outside directors, was negatively
related to the performance of acquisitions in the banking indus-
try, but that outside director stock ownership, another indicator
of independence, had positive performance effects. However, in
the present study we did not find evidence for a curvilinear rela-
tionship of independence, nor did we find evidence for divergent
effects of different indicators of independence.
suggested that directors might be more effective
advisors to the extent that they have the ‘right’
kinds of knowledge and expertise (Carpenter and
Westphal, 2001; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003), but
there has been little systematic effort to ‘unpack’
this basic notion and there has been little, if any,
empirical research conducted on the performance
effects of outside director experience and expertise.
There has, by extension, been little consideration
of the boundary conditions under which director
expertise might have stronger or weaker effects on
performance outcomes.
This article sought to address these important
issues. We exploited theory and findings from psy-
chological theory and research on expertise to
develop a conceptual framework that delineates the
sources of relevant director knowledge and exper-
tise and the specific nature of the link between
director expertise and firm-level performance out-
comes. We are aware of no prior publications that
are singularly focused on this critical issue. An
essential thesis of the expertise literature is that
expertise and expert performance tends to be spe-
cific to particular knowledge domains. This the-
ory and evidence led us to conclude that directors
would be unlikely to possess some broad expertise
in undertaking all kinds of acquisitions. Different
kinds of acquisitions require executives to draw
on distinct knowledge bases, and thus we con-
cluded that directors would likely develop exper-
tise in pursuing specific types of acquisitions. We
more specifically argued that directors will develop
expertise in undertaking (i) acquisitions in particu-
lar industries or product markets, (ii) related acqui-
sitions, and (iii) unrelated acquisitions.
The psychological literature on expertise fur-
ther indicates that prior experience with making
decisions in a particular knowledge domain is a
critical source for the development of expertise
in that domain. Experience with a particular kind
of complex decision facilitates the development of
the more extensive, and better organized, knowl-
edge that is the hallmark of expert knowledge in a
particular domain. The more extensive and better
organized knowledge that experts possess supports
better decision making. We, therefore, concluded
that outside directors would develop expertise in
doing each of the three types of acquisitions speci-
fied above to the extent that they had been involved
with a significant number of acquisitions of the
relevant type through their past service on other
boards of directors.
Copyright  2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Strat. Mgmt. J., 29: 1155–1177 (2008)
DOI: 10.1002/smj
1172 M. L. McDonald, J. D. Westphal, and M. E. Graebner
Consistent with this line of reasoning, we offered
three specific hypotheses regarding the main effects
of director experience and resulting expertise on
firm acquisition performance. We hypothesized
that a firm would make better acquisition deci-
sions to the extent that the firm’s outside directors
had experience with acquisition decisions in the
same product markets as the acquisitions being
pursued by the focal firm. We also predicted that
a firm’s related acquisitions would perform bet-
ter to the extent that outside directors had expe-
rience in making related acquisitions, and that a
firm’s unrelated acquisitions would be of higher
quality to the extent that outside directors were
experienced in making unrelated acquisitions. We
found considerable empirical support for this set
of hypotheses. In fact, our results were consistent
with all three predictions.
We went on to consider an important modera-
tor of the performance effects of outside director
expertise. In this regard, we continued to be guided
by the psychological literature on expertise and its
role in group decision making. This literature sug-
gests that in group decision making (e.g., board
decision making), individual member expertise is
most beneficial to the extent that high-expertise
members have relatively high levels of influence
on decision making (and low expertise members
have limited influence). We, therefore, concluded
that the performance benefits of relevant outside
director acquisition expertise would be moderated
by the degree to which outside directors are will-
ing and able to shape firm strategic decisions. The
extant board’s literature indicates that a critical
determinant of outside directors’ propensities to
interject themselves into strategic decision making
is their relative independence from management.
We, therefore, predicted that board independence
would amplify (i.e., make more positive) the pos-
itive performance effects of (1) outside directors’
experience with acquisitions in the same industries
or product markets in which a focal firm is mak-
ing acquisitions, (2) outside directors’ experience
with related acquisitions, and (3) outside directors’
experience with unrelated acquisitions. All of our
formal hypotheses in this regard were also sup-
ported by our empirical findings.
Theoretical contributions
The core contribution of this article is that it may
represent the first systematic effort to develop and
empirically test a theoretical model of the rela-
tionship between outside director experience and
expertise and firm-level performance outcomes.
The basic notion that outside director expertise
might prove beneficial is, admittedly, not a novel
one. However, few efforts have been made to con-
ceptually elaborate this largely undeveloped idea.
In fact, we are aware of no prior published study
that is singularly focused on this issue. The lim-
ited attention given to the role of director exper-
tise in theories of board effectiveness is brought
into especially sharp relief when we consider the
large number of empirical studies and theoretical
treatments that have focused on the supposed per-
formance benefits of a wide range of indicators of
board independence.
We believe that it is important to note that
this article also posits a previously unconsidered
role for board independence from management
as a contributor to board effectiveness. Prevail-
ing perspectives have traditionally viewed board
independence primarily as an indicator of out-
side directors’ capacities to act objectively to
block management-proposed initiatives that are
inconsistent with shareholder interests. Our theory
instead highlights how board independence, and
the greater outside director involvement in strate-
gic decision making that it brings, acts as a critical
moderator of the firm-level performance effects of
outside director experience and expertise. Our con-
ceptual arguments also suggest how CEOs might
respond to greater board independence in more
constructive ways to the extent that independent
directors possess expertise that is closely related to
the strategic issues facing the focal firm. Our argu-
ments suggest, for example, how expertise might
reduce CEO ‘reactance’ (Westphal, 1998) in the
face of increased board independence.
Our theory and empirical findings make con-
tributions that extend beyond its principal ones,
which were outlined above. Our model and results
can also inform the literature on learning from
experience by organizations, especially the nascent
literature on organizational learning from experi-
ence with acquisitions (e.g., Haleblian and Finkel-
stein, 1999; Hayward, 2002). This literature has
been principally concerned with how the perfor-
mance of a firm’s acquisitions is influenced by
the firm’s own prior acquisition experience. The
baseline theoretical proposition in this research
stream has been that firms and their executives
learn from their prior experiences in acquiring
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other companies and that, as a result, we should
expect a positive relationship between the num-
ber of acquisitions that a firm has conducted in
the past and the performance of its subsequent
acquisitions. Surprisingly, empirical research has
generally failed to consistently confirm this rela-
tionship. Researchers have variously found that the
amount of prior same-firm acquisition experience
has a negative (Kusewitt, 1985), positive (Fowler
and Schmidt 1989), and neutral (Bruton, Oviatt,
and White 1994; Hayward 2002; King et al., 2004;
Zollo and Singh 2004) effect on subsequent acqui-
sition performance.
Haleblian and Finkelstein (1999) drew from
behavioral learning theory to offer an explanation
for these conflicting findings, arguing that the value
of a firm’s prior acquisition experience depends
on the similarity of current and past acquisitions
(see also Hayward, 2002). They offered empiri-
cal support for this argument in their finding that
acquisitions perform better when past acquisitions
by the focal firm were in the same product market
as the current acquisition. Using the psychologi-
cal literature on how people develop expertise in
knowledge-rich domains, we make a parallel argu-
ment regarding the prior acquisitions not of the
focal firm, but of its outside directors. Our find-
ings provide further support for the view that prior
experience helps firm leaders develop a special-
ized rather than generalized acquisition capabil-
ity.
Managerial implications
Aside from the contributions to theory and research
outlined above, our theoretical perspective and
findings also have fairly straightforward implica-
tions for the practice of corporate governance.
In particular, our theory suggests that corporate
leaders should select and retain outside directors
whose prior experience fits with key elements of
the firm’s corporate strategy, including its acqui-
sition strategy. If the firm’s corporate strategy
will require related acquisitions, corporate lead-
ers should seek to attract and retain independent
directors who have prior experience with making
decisions about related acquisitions; if the firm’s
corporate strategy will require acquisitions in a
particular product market, corporate leaders should
seek to attract and retain independent directors who
have prior experience with making decisions about
acquisitions in that product market, and so forth.
Our theoretical framework further suggests how
instituting widely advocated board reforms that
are expected to enhance director independence
from management will amplify the benefits of hav-
ing outside directors who have relevant strategic
expertise. Director expertise will prove more ben-
eficial to the extent that it actually impacts strate-
gic decisions, and greater independence generally
increases the relative influence of outside directors.
It is worth noting that while our theory suggests
specific criteria that should be considered in the
director selection process, these criteria can also
be quantified in our empirical model. Thus, the
model itself could be used as a formal decision
aid in director selection.
Limitations and directions for future research
We note here that our theory and primary analyses
do not address the issue of the implications that the
performance of the past acquisitions that directors
were involved in might have for their abilities to
make constructive contributions to a focal firm’s
current acquisition decisions. We conducted pre-
liminary, supplementary analyses to explore this
issue. Some prior research has suggested how firms
and their managers might learn from a mix of
low and high performing past decisions because
this pattern of past experiences enhances their
abilities to identify the defining characteristics of
‘good’ and ‘bad’ decisions (e.g., Beckman and
Haunschild, 2002). However, our supplementary
analyses suggest that directors’ prior experience
with acquisition decisions is most beneficial when
outside directors have been exposed to mostly suc-
cessful acquisitions of the relevant type in the past,
rather than a set of acquisitions where performance
outcomes were more mixed. Future research might
more systematically explore this issue and attempt
to reconcile these seemingly disparate findings.
In this article, our conceptual arguments and
empirical findings focus exclusively on the effects
that outside directors have on the performance
of one kind of strategic action, firm acquisi-
tions. However, we believe that the general prin-
ciples of our theory might be extended to con-
sider how other aspects of outside directors’ prior
experiences (e.g., their experiences with strate-
gic alliances) impact the relative success of other
kinds of focal firm strategic actions (e.g., a focal
firm’s strategic alliances). The examination of such
questions represents a potentially wide avenue for
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future research that could ultimately come to rep-
resent a second main ‘front’ in research on the key
sources of board effectiveness.
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